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Abstract
This paper contains three useful contributions: (1) it collects a new data-set of electronic
transaction data on soybean futures from the Dalian Futures Exchange in China that
records, not only the usual elements of each transaction (such as price and size) but also
identifies broker and customer identities, variables not usually obtainable; (2) it presents
new econometric methods for the analysis of dynamic multivariate count data based on
the autoregressive conditional intensity model of Jordà and Marcellino (2000); and (3)
together, the new data and econometric methods allow us to investigate, in a manner not
available before, the determinants and effects of non-institutional market making (or
scalping).
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1scalp·er \’ skalpǽ (r), -kaůp -\ n –s [‘scalp+er]: …c(1): a speculator who seeks
to make small profits on quick transactions…
– Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged.
1. Introduction
In futures exchanges, a scalper is a non-institutional agent who makes frequent purchases
and sales yet ends each day without any outstanding position. Collectively, scalpers
voluntarily approximate the role of institutional market makers by providing essential
liquidity services. This paper investigates this type of voluntary market making behavior
and examines its effects on market performance in a competitive, continuous-auction
environment in which there is no formal institutional market making. Specifically, we
analyze two central issues: (1) the determinants of scalper participation in the market, and
(2) the effects that scalping has on market liquidity and price volatility.
The earliest work on scalpers is by Working (1954, 1967, 1977), who studied two
months of trading records for “Mr. C”, a leading floor trader on the New York Cotton
Exchange in 1952. Working presented descriptive statistics and discussions on scalping
behavior in his papers, and in particular suggested that scalping contributes to market
“fluidity”, and that scalpers “derive income from hedgers through temporarily absorbing
hedging orders that are not immediately absorbed otherwise”. Working (1967) also
touched on the issue that scalping profit is positively related to trading frequency and
negatively related to trade size. Silber (1984) analyzed six weeks of trading records from
“Mr. X”, a “representative scalper” on the New York Futures Exchange during 1982-
1983, and derived similar conclusions regarding scalping strategy and profit. By studying
the Computerized Trade Reconstruction (CTR) records of twelve active futures from theApril, 2002 3
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) from July to September 1990, Kuserk and Locke
(1993) identified scalpers for each contract, and found that scalping revenue varies across
commodities and that scalpers tend to specialize in a particular commodity.
Both Working (1967, 1977) and Silber (1984) base their discussion on only one or
two scalpers, and the CTR data analyzed by Kuserk and Locke (1993) are compiled from
paper records at the end of a trading day and time-stamped to an accuracy of a 15-minute
bracket. By contrast, thanks to the implementation of electronic trading systems, we have
obtained all the transaction records of soybean futures from the Dalian Futures Exchange
in China for the period June to December, 1999. These data are time-stamped to the
second and each transaction record is marked with each trader’s identity, the price and
the volume of the transaction. The code for the trades reveals not just the broker but also
the individual customer. While previous studies of scalpers are mostly descriptive, the
richness of these data allows us to present more formal econometric evidence than has
been possible before.
Modern analysis of financial, high-frequency, tick-by-tick data (such as the data in
this study) relies on new econometric techniques based on the random arrival in time of
transactions (for a survey see Engle, 2000). As a result, this literature has favored the
approach of setting the problem in event time – that is, extracting the information
contained in the random durations elapsing between transactions. In this paper, because
scalping is likely to depend on cross-contract characteristics (such as scalping profit
opportunities, price volatility, trading volume and intensity), multivariate extensions of
existing econometric methods in event time quickly become impractical. The explanation
resides in these models’ inability to condition on information other than that available atApril, 2002 4
each event node. Since trades on different contracts are unlikely to arrive at exactly the
same time, this constitutes a substantial shortcoming for the purposes of our research.
Instead, this paper presents an alternative strategy for analyzing multivariate, high-
frequency, financial data based on the dual of any duration problem: the count process
associated to it. Specifically, we will aggregate the data into five-minute intervals. During
these short intervals over which scalping matters, the number of scalpers and the number
of their trades are both small integers or counts. Thus, in order to analyze the effect of
past information and other determinants of scalper presence in a dynamic context, we
experiment with a new class of dynamic count data models: the autoregressive
conditional intensity model (ACI) introduced in Jordà and Marcellino (2000).
Bivariate ACI estimates suggest that, all else equal, volatility and high levels of
transaction activity, strongly determine a scalper’s incentives to enter the market. In
particular, Working’s (1967) observations that scalping is negatively related to trading
size and positively related to trading frequency are sustained by our findings. Moreover,
there are important complementarities to scalping across contracts that seem to be
assiduously exploited by scalpers. However, with regard to the effects that scalping has
on price volatility and “fluidity” (to paraphrase Working’s terminology) we are unable to
detect anything of significance although this may be partly due to the fact that scalping
represents a relatively small portion of overall trading.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the data
that we collected for this study and explains how we identify scalpers. The next section
discusses candidate determinants of scalper presence in the market. Section 4 presents the
econometric aspects of the ACI model and implements it to examine scalperApril, 2002 5
participation. Section 5 analyzes the effects of scalping on volatility while the last section
concludes and presents directions for further research.
2. Data Description
The data that we use in this study was collected at the source from the Dalian Futures
Exchange in China. We were able to obtain seven months worth of electronic transaction
records of soybean futures for the period spanning June to December, 1999. Each
transaction record is marked with broker and customer identities, transaction price and
volume, a buy or sell indicator, an indicator of opening or closing positions, as well as a
time stamp.
There are six soybean futures contracts with expiration dates in January, March,
May, July, September and November. A contract expires in its delivery month midway
through which, trading tends to wind down almost completely. For example, trading on
the July 2000 futures contract started in mid July 1999 and ended in mid July 2000. Thus,
the trading of a contract gains considerable momentum usually two months after its
trading date and remains active for another two months before the volume declines
dramatically. However, the level of overall trading activity also depends on the season as
well as on trading in the spot market. Figure 1 illustrates these patterns by displaying the
average trading volumes of the two most actively traded contracts in our sample. In the
Dalian Futures Exchange, soybean futures are most actively traded during September to
the following January of each year, during which price volatility is high. The futures
prices determined during this period tend to set the tone for the rest of the season (Dalian
Futures Exchange, 2000).April, 2002 6
A preliminary analysis of these transaction data reveals several key
characteristics. There are 140 member firms in total of which 125 are brokerage firms
with 6213 distinct customers in all. The remaining 15 member firms only trade for their
own accounts and each has a seat in the exchange. A member firm can have several seats
on the exchange floor, and it can also apply for a distance-trading seat to trade directly
off the exchange. However, regulations of the Dalian Futures Exchange prevent
brokerage firms from trading on their own accounts and similarly, prevent member firms
trading on their own accounts from conducting brokerage business. Table 1 presents a
summary of the relevant demographics for all these member firms.
2.1 Identifying Scalpers
The central topic of this paper consists on explaining non-institutional market making
behavior by scalpers. Consequently, we first need to identify which traders act as scalpers
from a universe of over six thousand market participants. Scalpers are characterized by
trading frequently during the day but rarely holding significant overnight positions. Using
these two criteria, we define “frequent” trading to mean making at least one trade every
15 minutes on average. Since trading sessions last for two and one half hours (from 9:00
am to 11:30 am) this is equivalent to placing at least 10 orders a day. In addition, there
are approximately 20 trading days in any given month. We will further require that for a
trader to be considered a candidate scalper, they must follow the trading pattern described
above for at least six days in a month.
These two criteria discriminate approximately 10 scalper candidates each month
for the period June to December, 1999. In addition, we complement our selection criteriaApril, 2002 7
to rule out “day traders.” Specifically, day traders are characterized by placing numerous
one-sided orders and then liquidating these positions with reverse orders a half hour to an
hour later. Traders that exhibit this trading pattern are excluded from the candidate
scalper pool. To complete our selection, we expanded the scalper pool to include traders
that have been consistently selected as scalpers in previous months but in a given month
only trade actively for four or five days. The resulting number of scalpers each month in
the sample is reported in Table 2 whereas the intra-day pattern of scalper presence in the
two most actively traded contracts is displayed in the top panel of Figure 2.
3. The Determinants of Scalping Activity
Given the scalpers identified by the procedures described in the previous section, this
section investigates what determines a scalper’s decision to enter the market. As we shall
see shortly, we will explore several candidate factors that include scalping profit
opportunities, price volatility, transaction intensity, transaction volume and scalping
competition. However, because we are using high-frequency, electronic transaction data,
it is worth discussing more fundamental methodological issues first.
The availability of ultra-high frequency, tick-by-tick data (such as the one we
study in this paper) has revolutionized the area of financial econometrics (for a survey see
Engle, 2000). These data inherently arrive at random times and thus require of new
econometric modeling techniques that deal with the random durations that elapse
between transactions in a dynamic manner. One way to approach this problem is given by
the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model proposed by Engle and RussellApril, 2002 8
(1998). The ACD model is a dynamic duration model in which the conditioning on past
and exogenous or predetermined variables takes place in event time.
This last consideration constitutes a significant disadvantage for our study: often
times we will want to condition on variables whose realizations do not coincide precisely
with the event-arrival times of the dependent variables. Consequently, we have decided to
work instead with the dual of any duration problem – the count process associated to it.
We choose to aggregate the data into 5-minute intervals so that each trading day will
contain 30 such intervals. Because scalpers close their positions usually within a few
minutes, a five-minute interval is long enough to measure relevant statistics, but short
enough to preserve the microstructure of trading. For instance, as the top left panel of
Figure 2 reveals, the trading-day average number of scalpers present organized into five-
minute intervals ranges from a high of 3 to a low of 1 with an average value of about 2.
It is well known that when the count variable associated to a duration process
attains the value of one over the interval of observation, then there is no loss of
information in estimating the count model instead of the duration model. In Section 4 we
will estimate a dynamic count data model for the number of scalpers present which, as we
have just seen, is a count variable whose mean is close to 2. This suggests that by
aggregating the data into five-minute intervals, the loss of information due to this
aggregation can be regarded as trivial, particularly when compared to the gains resulting
from conducting the analysis in calendar time instead of in event time. Section 4 will
therefore present in detail the econometric methods we have designed to attack the
problem in this fashion. Before then however, we discuss the variables we will use to
describe scalper’s entry decisions.April, 2002 9
3.1 Scalper’s Spread
Market-makers on NASDAQ, specialists on NYSE, and scalpers in futures markets can
all be considered as providers of a matching service between buyers and sellers who need
immediate execution of their orders. The “price of immediacy” (Demsetz, 1968;
Grossman and Miller, 1988) thus becomes the mechanism by which scalpers derive their
profit. A natural way to determine this implicit cost of trading traditionally relies on
measures of the bid-ask spread: the price difference paid by urgent buyers and urgent
sellers. Unfortunately, our data do not provide bid-ask quotes (however, O’Hara, 1995
suggests that the bid-ask spread may be sensitive trade size, thus making across market
comparisons difficult).
Instead, we construct a measure of scalping profit opportunities, which we denote
scalper’s spread, as follows. Let vτ
k(j)a n dpτ
k(j) denote the volume and price of a given
transaction respectively, where ] , 1 ( t t − ∈ τ indicates that the transaction belongs to the
five-minute interval t; K k ∈ denotes that k belongs to the set of scalpers K,a n d
} , { S B j∈ denotes that the transaction was a buy if j=B(from the point of buy of the
scalper), and a sale if j=S . Therefore, we define scalper’s spread as the difference
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The bigger the spread SSt the bigger the profit opportunities are for scalping, which may
be taken as an indicator of market liquidity conditions (see Grossman and Miller, 1988).
3.2 Volatility
Intimately related to a scalper’s profit opportunities measured by SSt, is the notion of
price volatility. Price changes typically represent shocks to order imbalance and
therefore, the larger these imbalances, the more plentiful scalping profit opportunities are.
Working (1967) noted that there is “price jiggling” in futures markets by which he meant
small price changes in one direction immediately followed by a price change in the
opposite direction. Working (1967) attributes this price pattern to the imbalance of
market orders at a point in time and suggests that scalping tends to restrict the size of
price jiggling. Garbade and Silber (1979) also suggest that scalper participation in a
continuous-auction market reduces the volatility of transaction prices around the
equilibrium price. Daigler and Wiley (1999) find that clearing members in futures
markets, who observe order flow, reduce the volatility of their own trades.
These views suggest that price volatility will be an important predictor of scalper
presence while also suggesting that scalping has positive externalities on price volatility.
We will investigate the latter issue in more detail below when we investigate the response
of volatility to scalping and trading volumes across the two most actively traded contracts
in our sample (the May 2000 and July 2000 contracts). Here, however, our first concern
is that of measuring price volatility itself.
The traditional approach to measuring volatility in financial markets typically
relies on some GARCH based measure since it is infeasible to compute price volatilityApril, 2002 11
from single price observations for each period. However, because we are analyzing the
data in five-minute intervals, it is straightforward to compute a volume-weighted sample
estimate of price volatility. In particular and following the notation in subsection 3.1, let
vτ denote the volume associated with the τ
th transaction in the interval (t-1, t] (note that
here we do not distinguish whether or not the transaction involves a scalper), and let pτ be
the associated price. Similarly, let Vt denote the total transaction volume in interval t and
define the volume-weighted price average during the t
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The top right panel of Figure 2 displays the intra-day seasonal patterns for this measure
of volatility. These exhibit the usual “volatility smile” patterns common to many
financial price time series: volatility tends to be highest at the opening and close of the
market.
3.3 Other determinants
In addition to a scalper’s spread and price volatility, we will investigate two groups of
variables that relate to the level of transaction activity in the market: transaction volume
and transaction intensity. For each group, we will classify the variable into scalper and
non-scalper transactions. Specifically, Vt
j will denote total volume transacted in the t
th
five-minute interval, where j=kwill denote scalper transactions and j=nwill denoteApril, 2002 12
non-scalper transactions. Similarly, It
j will denote the transaction intensity (number of
transactions) during the t
th interval for j=k ,n .Although the joint inclusion of volume
and intensity variables may appear redundant (they both measure the level of market
activity), a small number of high volume transactions may present different scalping
incentives than a high number of small volume of transactions (this was Working’s, 1967
observation). The distinction between scalper and non-scalper transaction activity owes
to the fact that while the first is associated with scalping opportunities, the latter reflects
scalping competition. With regard to the intra-day patterns of transaction activity, the
bottom panels in Figure 2 display the average variation in the total number of transactions
throughout the trading day along with the total number of scalper transactions.
4. Predicting Scalper Presence
This section investigates which are the best predictors of scalper’s presence. Although
our dataset contains six soybean active futures contracts with differing maturing dates,
we find that scalpers tend to limit their participation to the two most actively traded
contracts during any given day. Because of the maturity structure of these contracts, we
refer to the most actively traded contract as the dominant contract and similarly, denote
the second most actively traded contract as the subsidiary contract. In particular, the May
2000 contract will be the dominant contract in our sample, with July 2000 as the
subsidiary. The sample that we investigate includes 100 days of trading that took place
between August to December 1999, in other words, 3000, 5-minute interval observations.April, 2002 13
4.1 The Autoregressive Conditional Intensity Model
The number of scalpers present in any given 5-minute interval is a count variable that
shares many characteristics with variables such as the number of customers that arrive at
a service facility, the arrival of phone calls at a switchboard, and other analogous
variables that describe rather infrequent events that occur at random times within the
interval of observation. Therefore, it is natural to treat the number of scalpers as a count
variable that we denote as yt, where the subscript t refers to the five-minute interval
associated to it. The benchmark for count data is the Poisson distribution (see Cameron
and Trivedi, 1998 for an excellent survey on count data models), with density
,... 2 , 1 , 0
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so that logλ t depends linearly on xt, a vector of explanatory variables which will primarily
include the variables discussed in section 3, along with lags of the dependent variable y.
Expression (4) is called the exponential mean function and together with expression (3)
they form the Poisson regression model, the workhorse of count data models. The model
can be easily estimated by maximum likelihood and conventional numerical techniques
since the likelihood is globally concave.April, 2002 14
However, unlike most applications of the Poisson regression model, the variable
yt is a time series that exhibits remarkable persistence. For example, the Ljung-Box
statistic for the May 2000 contract attains a value of Q5 = 1228 at five lags and Q10 =
7409 at ten lags, well above the conventional 5% critical value (in fact, the first five
values of the autocorrelation function are above 0.5 for both the May 2000 and the July
2000 contracts). One solution to this problem is offered in Jordà and Marcellino (2000) in
which the intensity of the Poisson process described in expression (4) is formulated to
have a time series representation similar to that of an ACD or GARCH models. In
particular, Jordà and Marcellino (2000) replace expression (4) with
γ β λ α λ
'
1 1) log( ) log( t t t t y x + + = − − (5)
Thus, the model given by expressions (3) and (5) is referred to as the autoregressive
conditional intensity model of order (1,1) or ACI(1,1). Extensions of expression (5) to
general lags ACI(p, q) are trivial but to focus the discussion consider the simple (1,1)
case. Expression (5) ensures that the intensity parameter λ t remains strictly positive for
all values of the parameters α , β , γ while allowing the dependence of logλ t to be linear in
its past values. The process described in (5) will be stationary as long as α + β <1 .N o t e
that the ACI(1,1) endows the original expression in (4) with rather rich dynamics in a
parsimonious manner: the process logλ t depends on lags of yt-1 and xt at a geometrically
decaying rate α . Estimation of the ACI(1,1) can be done by conditional maximum
likelihood techniques by setting λ 0 to the unconditional mean of y (alternatively, λ 0 can
be estimated as an additional parameter if the model is nonstationary, for example) and isApril, 2002 15
disarmingly simple. For example, one can specify the following three lines of code in the
LogL object in EViews, version 4.0 (see EViews manual, chapter 18):
@log ll
log(lambda) = c(1) + c(2)*log(lambda(-1)) + c(3)*y(-1) + c(4)*x
ll = log(@dpoisson(y, lambda))
The empirical analysis that we report below involves scalper presence in the May 2000
and July 2000 contracts, which we will denote by yt
M and yt
J respectively. It is common
practice for scalpers to concentrate their trading on the dominant contract (May 2000) for
one or two hours, and then switch to the subsidiary contract (July 2000). Consequently, in
order to determine scalper participation in the market, it is important to model the joint
behavior of yt
M and yt




J are both count variables and let xt now be a vector of
explanatory variables that includes the scalping opportunities in both contracts. The
object of interest is now the joint density for yt
M and yt
J, which can be decomposed,
without loss of generality, as
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M and h(.) is the
conditional density of yt
J given yt
M. Fully parametric approaches based on the jointApril, 2002 16
distribution of non-Gaussian random variables given a set of covariates are difficult to
apply because analytically and computationally tractable expressions for such joint
distributions are available for special cases only, and in fact, applications of multivariate
count models are relatively uncommon (see chapter 8, Cameron and Trivedi, 1988).
However, because of the nature of the contracts that we are investigating, it is
straightforward to assign a hierarchical structure to the dominant and subsidiary contracts
to the decomposition in expression (6). In particular, we will assume that g(.) and h(.) are
univariate Poisson densities whose conditional means follow the bivariate version of the

























































































































Note that expression (7) imposes a similar semi-structural restriction to that in the
analysis of the structural-VAR literature: namely, that of imposing a Wold-causal order
which in this case consists on having the contemporaneous values of the dominant
contract’s dependent variables appear in the expression of the conditional mean for the
subsidiary contract. The bivariate ACI(1,1) model expanded by expression (7) can be
easily estimated by maximizing the joint conditional likelihood expression in (6) by
numerical techniques.April, 2002 17
4.2 ACI Estimates
This section presents estimates obtained with the bivariate ACI model in expressions (3),
(6) and (7) but it complements the analysis with univariate ACI and simple Poisson
regression estimates to provide a benchmark with which to compare the benefits of the
ACI methodology. To reiterate the main elements of the analysis, the data is organized in
five-minute intervals, each trading day containing 30 such intervals (9:00am to 11:30am)
and there are 100 such days in our sample (which correspond to the period August to
December 1999). However, since there is no trading during the morning break (10:15am
to 11:00am) we drop observations 16 through 18 in each trading day (all the variables
attain zero values during these periods). The dependent variables yt
i for i=M ,Jdenote
the number of scalpers present in trading for the May 2000 (denoted by i=M )a n dt h e
July 2000 (denoted by i= J ) contracts.
The vector of explanatory variables xt will contain the following variables. The
intra-day seasonal pattern will be captured with a set of 27 dummy variables (one for
each five-minute interval in a trading day) denoted Dt’=( d1t,… ,d15t, d19t,… ,d30t) with
dit =1i ft ∈ i





for i= M ,Jwill contain the variables described in section 3 for each contract, (we abuse
notation in favor of simplifying the presentation by forgoing the indicator subscript for
the type of contract in each individual element of zit).
We begin by discussing univariate estimates of the Poisson and ACI regression
models (expressions (3)-(5)). These are reported in Table 3. The Poisson regression
model contains up to four lags of the explanatory variables so that xt’= (Dt’, zt-1’, …, zt-4’,
yt-1,… ,yt-4). On the other hand, the ACI only contains one lag so that xt’= (Dt’, zt-1’),April, 2002 18
(note that yt-1 appears explicitly in expression (5) and is therefore omitted from x).
Because we are estimating univariate models, note that we have dropped the subscript
that indicates to what contract do the covariates belong to since the model for each
contract will only contain regressors specific to that contract. The parameter estimates for
the Poisson regression model are omitted and only the basic regression statistics are
reported at the bottom of Table 3.
The first result worth remarking is the substantial efficiency with which the ACI
model deals with the dynamics. Note that, although the Poisson regression model
contains 20 additional regressors, it attains a lower likelihood value than the ACI
estimates (note that the likelihood values are directly comparable). The reason for this
result is made evident by the parameter estimates for the variables yt-1 and log(λ t-1)( α and
β in expression (5)): their sum is approximately 0.85 for both contracts suggesting a
substantial amount of persistence (although this value is well below the canonical value
of one, suggesting that the model is stationary). With regard to estimates for particular
variables, we prefer to discuss the results in the context of the bivariate estimates. Here
we simply remark that, contrary to our expectations, the scalper spread variable, SSt-1,d i d
not appear to explain scalper presence. Generally speaking, volatility and transaction
activity levels of non-scalpers appear to increase the likelihood of additional scalper
presence while scalper activity has the opposite effect.
Table 4 contains the estimates for the bivariate ACI specification in expression
(7). Note that now xt’=( Dt’, zM,t-1’, zJ,t-1’), that is, the explanatory variables for each of
the contracts appear in the regression of each contract (this was not the case with the
univariate counterparts). As before, note that the amount of persistence detected is quiteApril, 2002 19
substantial: for the May 2000 contract, α + β =0 . 9 5 ; and for the July 2000 contract, α +
β =0 . 8 9 . The scalper-spread variable is not significant overall except in the May 2000
equation, where a significant and negative coefficient on the July 2000 scalper spread
suggests that when profit opportunities are good in this contract, they decrease the
likelihood of additional scalpers entering the May 2000 contract, as one would expect. As
before, volatility is perhaps the most consistent predictor of scalper presence, always
entering positively and significantly.
With respect to the interaction between the May 2000 and the July 2000 contracts,
the former appears to be more sensitive to characteristics of the latter than vice versa (in
terms of the overall significance level of the cross-contract covariates). In what follows,
self-contract variables denote regressors that belong to the contract whose dependent
variable is being explained, while cross-contract variables will denote regressors that
belong to the alternative contract being explained. Hence, with respect to the volume
variables, self-contract scalper and non-scalper volume enter negatively but only
significantly in the July 2000 contract equation. The self-contract intensity variables also
enter with the correct signs, so that together with the volume variable estimates, we are
able to replicate Working’s (1967) findings on the negative effects of trading size and the
positive effects of transaction frequency on scalping. The cross-contract effects of the
volume variables and the scalper intensity variables suggest that there is significant
substitution of scalping across contracts. However, the signs on the cross-contract, non-
scalper intensity variables suggest complementarity rather than substitution.
The overall fit of the bivariate ACI is substantially better than the fit of the
individual univariate ACI models (the log-likelihood increases from –7932.062 to –April, 2002 20
7664.709 but with 18 additional regressors). The p-value of the likelihood ratio statistic
for the additional regressors in the bivariate model is essentially zero, suggesting the
bivariate ACI is a substantial improvement.
We conclude this section by summarizing the main findings. First, between the
two liquidity proxy variables, scalper spread and volatility, the latter is an important and
more significant determinant of scalper presence. Second, the interaction between volume
and trading intensity suggests that they contain specific information regarding trading
activity levels and that they should be jointly included when determining scalper
presence. Third, methodologically speaking we demonstrate conclusively the virtues of
the ACI model relative to classical Poisson regression when the dependent variable is an
autocorrelated time series.
4.3. Robustness: The Tale of Mr. D
The empirical investigation in the previous subsection is based on the aggregate behavior
of those traders that, in a given month, belong to the class of scalpers we have defined in
Section 2.1. However, one could ask how well does this aggregative approach represent
individual scalper behavior. To answer this question, we recorded the transaction activity
of an anonymous trader – whom we called Mr. D – who belonged to the class of scalpers
during most of the months in our sample.
Mr. D is a rather active trader, having engaged in transactions about 20% of the
time in the May 2000 contract and one-third of the time in the July 2000 contract. In the
5-minute intervals in which he is active, he engages in two transactions on average
although sometimes it can be as many as 21. His pattern of trades corresponds ratherApril, 2002 21
closely to any conventional notion of scalping: any position he holds is typically reversed
within the same or one 5-minute interval after it is acquired and he rarely finishes the day
with any significant positions.
We investigate Mr. D’s trading patterns using the same approach (the ACI model)
and the same explanatory variables as in the previous subsection with the exception of the
dependent variable – the variable
i
t y , i= M ,J , although a still a count variable, now
records Mr. D’s transactions in a given 5-minute interval instead. Table 5 directly reports
the bivariate ACI(1,1) estimates of this model, which is based on the specification in
expression (7) and is estimated over the same sample as in Table 4 to make the results
between these tables easily comparable.
Several results deserve comment. Overall, there is a remarkable qualitative
similitude between the aggregate results in Table 4 and the results for Mr. D in Table 5:
the coefficient estimates are different in magnitude because the dependent variables are
different but the sign and the significance levels are very similar. Once again, the
ACI(1,1) specification captures a significant amount of persistence with α + β =0 . 7 7for
the May 2000 contract and α + β =0 . 7 3for the July 2000 contract.
However, there are some differences between models in that Mr. D
appears to be more preoccupied with the May 2000 contract variables than with the July
2000 contract. Thus, for example, when volatility is high in the May 2000 contract, Mr. D
reduces his engagement in July 2000 trading and conversely, when the volume of
transactions and the transaction intensity of scalpers in the May 2000 contract increases,
Mr. D becomes more engaged in July 2000 contract trading. But other than the different
hierarchy between the contracts, as these results show, they confirm the essential findingsApril, 2002 22
of the aggregative model and provide a robustness check to our conclusions. The next
section investigates some of the interactions between volatility, scalper transacted volume
and non-scalper volume that will complement the results in this section.
5. Volatility Responses to Scalper and Non-Scalper Transaction Activity
The previous section allowed us to investigate the determinants of scalper presence in the
market for soybean futures in the Dalian Futures Exchange. However, while we were
able to ascertain that, among other factors, volatility is an important determinant of
scalper presence, our discussion in Subsection 3.2 suggests that scalping may have
important positive externalities on volatility. Scalping activity and competition are likely
to reduce the magnitude of order imbalances (the main source of scalping profit),
therefore mitigating price volatility. On the other hand, the overall level of volatility is
mostly correlated with the general level of transaction activity: thin markets tend to
display higher levels of volatility. Finally, the interaction between the dominant and
subsidiary contracts is likely to contribute to fluctuations in the relative levels of
volatility experienced in each of these markets.
Evaluating how volatility responds to scalping therefore requires that we consider
all of these issues simultaneously in the context of a general dynamic model. In essence,
the type of question we want to answer is: What is the dynamic response volatility to
scalping, conditional on past information and, on transaction activity levels and cross-
contract interactions? To answer this question we follow a two-pronged approach based
on a structural vector autoregression (VAR). The first prong consists on analyzing the
dynamic response of volatility to structural shocks of the variables in the system (whichApril, 2002 23
will be defined shortly) while the second prong consists on counter-factual
experimentation. Specifically, we will analyze the response of volatility to transaction
activity shocks under two scenarios: the first allows for the usual response of scalping
activity to such a shock while the second shuts down scalping responses instead. The
difference in the dynamic response of volatility to these two scenarios will reflect scalper
externalities.
We turn now to the specific implementation of these experiments. Consider the
vector of variables, wt’=( xMt’, xJt’) where xit’=( σ t, It
n, It
k)f o ri=M ,J(once more, we
abuse notation slightly by omitting subscripts on the component variables of xit for the
sake of clarity). All of the component variables in x have been defined previously in
Section 3 and they are respectively: volatility, non-scalper transaction intensity, and
scalper transaction intensity.
Consequently, the vector w will be modeled as a finite order VAR. To endow the
model with a structural interpretation, we follow the conventional assumptions in the
extensive VAR literature (see chapter 11, Hamilton 1994) based on the Cholesky
decomposition and the specification of a Wold-causal ordering of the vector of
contemporaneous variables, wt. The configuration of our problem confers a natural
hierarchy that is based on the maturity of the contracts. Recall that the May 2000 contract
is the dominant contract with the July 2000 contract as the subsidiary. Subsequently, the
block of variables xMt will be ordered Wold-causally prior to the block xJt.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
within each block, we will assume that scalper transaction intensity depends on the
contemporaneous values of the level of volatility and non-scalper transaction intensity.April, 2002 24
Therefore, within each of the blocks xit the Wold-causal order will place volatility ahead
of non-scalper transaction intensity and ahead of scalper transaction intensity.
5.1 The Dynamic Responses of Volatility
B a s e do nt h eV A Rd e s c r i b e di nt h ep r e v i o u ss ection, Figure 3 reports a selection of the
impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock to each of the variables in
the system, along with the associated asymptotic two standard error bands. These
responses are traced for up to one hour after the shock (12 five-minute intervals) and
constitute the first of the two prongs described in our research strategy. The next section
will discuss the results for the counterfactual experiments. Figure 3 is organized as
follows. Each row displays impulse responses of different variables to the shocks
specified at the beginning of each row (in order displayed: non-scalper transaction
intensity, scalper transaction intensity and volatility). The two headers at the top of the
different panels subdivide the display into two groups of columns according to whether
the shock was to a May 2000 contract variable or to a July 2000 variable instead. All the
shocks considered are positive by design.
We begin by examining the responses of scalper transaction activity to shocks in
volatility, which are displayed in the last row of Figure 3. These responses offer
confirmatory evidence of the results found in Section 4: an increase in volatility generates
increased scalping activity, both in the self-contract responses but also in the cross-
contract responses. The congruence of these results with those in Section 4 increase our
confidence both on the findings themselves and on the merits of the bivariate ACI
specification. Next, consider the responses displayed in the first row, which correspond toApril, 2002 25
shocks in non-scalper transaction intensity. As one would expect, an increase in this type
of activity generates higher self-contract volatility and scalper transaction intensity.
Finally, the second row of figures displays the more interesting albeit less
intuitive results. In response to a positive shock in scalper transaction intensity, we would
expect two effects: (1) cross-contract increases in scalper transaction intensity due to the
reduction of scalper competition, and (2) reductions in price volatility due to increases in
scalping services. However, the reaction in cross-contract scalping is clearly nil and while
volatility does not appear to be very sensitive to scalping transaction intensity levels,
there is some evidence that the initial response is significantly positive rather than
negative. Because of this last result, we examined how robust this finding is to alternative
measurements of scalping activity on volatility through the counterfactual experiment
reported in the next subsection.
5.2 Scalping Effects on Volatility: A Counterfactual Experiment
This section asks the question: How would have volatility responded to increased levels
of non-scalper transaction intensity if scalper activity were constrained to remain fixed
rather than respond by also increasing? If the hypothesis that scalping makes the market
more fluid is true, we should expect that volatility increase by a larger extent when
scalping is constrained than otherwise. Due to the apparent complementarity between the
May and July 2000 contracts found in both the ACI and VAR estimates reported in
subsections 4.2 and 5.1, we decided to implement our counterfactual experiment by
restricting the responses of the scalping intensity variables in both contracts to be
simultaneously constant in response to a shock in non-scalping trading intensity.April, 2002 26
Figure 4 therefore displays the results of this experiment and is organized as
follows. Each row corresponds to the responses of volatility due to a shock in non-
scalping transaction in the May 2000 contract (top row) and the July 2000 contract
(bottom row). Each column in turn displays the May 2000 volatility response (left
column) and the July 2000 response (right column). The panels on the diagonal of Figure
4 contain the same responses displayed in Figure 3 and essentially coincide with our
expectation that increased self-contract transaction activity generates more volatility.
However, note that when the scalping response is shut down, there is no statistical and
discernible difference in the response of volatility. This suggests that, at best, scalping is
not contributing positively to reducing volatility and, at worst, it is inducing higher
volatility a half hour after the shock in both contracts. The off-diagonal panels of Figure 4
contain the cross-contract responses of volatility. These are positive, further confirming
the complementarity that exists between contracts discussed in Subsection 5.1, but here
too, scalping has no effect on volatility.
6. Conclusion
This paper contains three main contributions. The main focus of the paper has been that
of studying non-institutional market making but to do an effective job we have obtained
an exclusive electronic transaction data set with customer and broker identities and we
have developed the appropriate econometric methods to deal with the challenges that
these data presented. Our results support earlier conclusions made by Working (1967)
regarding the effects of trade volume and trade size on scalper participation, but perhaps
more importantly, we have provided new light on the interaction of competing scalpingApril, 2002 27
opportunities in determining scalper presence in a particular contract. However, because
scalping represents a small fraction of total trading, we have been unable to establish that
scalping reduces price volatility. We suspect this result reflects the idiosyncrasies of our
data rather than more fundamental scalping externalities (or lack thereof).
In future work, the detailed nature of the data will allow us to investigate whom
are scalpers trading with and how scalper’s profit opportunities are affected by the
heterogeneous nature of other traders. In preliminary results, we have reason to believe
that there exist substantial information asymmetries among different groups of traders,
which affect their overall market performance. Nevertheless, although scalpers appear to
belong to the class of uninformed traders, they tend to perform substantially better than
other uninformed but non-scalping traders.
Finally, it is worth highlighting the advantages of modeling high frequency data
by aggregating the data into short intervals rather than by using the random arrival times
in which it is reported. By examining the count process associated with these dynamic
duration processes, we have been able to simplify the analysis in several dimensions. The
fixed-interval aggregation process allows the problem to be recast back into calendar time
rather than in event time. This allows for seasonal effects to be filtered in an effective,
general and straightforward manner by means of appropriate sets of seasonal dummies.
By contrast, dynamic duration models require of more sophisticated, non-parametric
smoothers. More fundamentally however, studying electronic transaction data in their
native state makes the conditioning on variables whose inter-arrival times do not coincide
with that of the endogenous variables a prohibitively complicated problem. We argue
that, as long as the interval of aggregation is sufficiently small, there is little loss of theApril, 2002 28
micro-structure effects financial economists may wish to study while the payoff in
simplicity is quite substantial. The ACI model demonstrates one effective way of taking
advantage of knowledge on the varying rates of transaction activity levels that have
characterized the newest family of dynamic duration models.April, 2002 29
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Year-end zero net position 3 5357
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Table 3. Predicting Scalper Presence: Estimates from Univariate ACI Models
Contract
May 2000 July 2000






























No. Coeffs. 35 35
Avg. LL -1.545 -1.398
Poisson Regression Estimates
Log-Likelihood -4185.788 -3795.074
No. Coeffs. 55 55
Avg. LL -1.553 -1.408
Observations 2700April, 2002 33
Table 4. Predicting Scalper Presence: Estimates from the Bivariate ACI Model
Contract
May 2000 July 2000
Parameter Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
yt - - 0.10
(0.01)
0.000
































































































Number of Coefficients 88
Average Log-Likelihood -2.843April, 2002 34
Table 5. Predicting Mr. D’s Transactions: Estimates from the Bivariate ACI Model
Contract
May 2000 July 2000
Parameter Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
yt - - 0.04
(0.02)
0.116






























































































Number of Coefficients 87
Average Log-Likelihood -1.710April, 2002 35
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Response ofJuly2000 Scalper Transaction Intensity







Selection of impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock to each of the
variables in the system: wt’=( xMt’, xJt’) where xit’=( σ t, It
n, It
k)f o ri=M ,J .T h e
component variables in x are respectively: volatility, non-scalper transaction intensity and
scalper transaction intensity. M denotes the May 2000 contract variables, J denotes the
July 2000 contract variables. Dotted lines represent the associated asymptotic two
standard error bands. These responses are traced for up to one hour after the shock (12
five-minute intervals).April, 2002 38
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Impulse Response with No Scalper Transactions
Response of Volatility in the July 2000 Contract to a





Impulse response functions of volatility to a one standard deviation shock to non-scalper
transaction intensity from the VAR for wt’=( xMt’, xJt’) where xit’=( σ t, It
n, It
k)f o ri=M ,
J. The component variables in x are respectively: volatility, non-scalper transaction
intensity and scalper transaction intensity. M denotes variables for the May 2000 contract,
J denotes variables for the July 2000 contract. Bold solid line with circular symbold
denotes the usual impulse response. Solid line with star symbols denotes the same
response but when the scalper response is shut-down. Dotted lines represent the
associated asymptotic two standard error bands. These responses are traced for up to one
hour after the shock (12 five-minute intervals).